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COPYRIGHT VERSUS THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: FORECASTING AN END
TO THE STORM*
by James L. Swanson**
I. INTRODUCTION
The goals of copyright law and the First Amendment seem comple-
mentary. The copyright clause of the United States Constitution autho-
rizes Congress to "promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries .... I" Copyright gives authors
an economic incentive to create works of value for the public. The First
Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press."2 This guarantee of free speech and
press appears to protect the expression that copyright coaxes into exist-
ence. The First Amendment allows authors to disseminate their works
free from governmental censorship, prior restraint or penalty. An au-
thor's "exclusive right" to profit from his creativity would be of little
value absent the right to offer his works to the public. Copyright gives
authors the incentive to create; the First Amendment gives them the
right to communicate. For nearly two centuries, the systems of copy-
right and free expression have served each other and the public.3
But all is not well between copyright and the First Amendment.
* This article received First Prize at the UCLA School of Law in the 1986 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers (ASCAP).
** Law Clerk to the Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg, United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, 1986-87. B.A., The University of Chicago, 1981; J.D., UCLA School of Law,
1986.
This article is dedicated to the memory of the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer, UCLA
School of Law. While he might have disagreed with some of the conclusions I reach, I am
grateful to Professor Nimmer for encouraging me to ask skeptical questions about the argu-
ments made by advocates, commentators and judges to justify a First Amendment exception to
copyright law.
I also want to thank Wesley J. Liebeler, Andrea E. Mays, Gary Stiffelman, Lionel S.
Sobel, David Nimmer and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg for helpful comments.
I. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Congress enacted the first Copyright Act on May 31, 1790, and the First Amendment
became effective in 1791.
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Some courts and commentators have argued that copyright, rather than
promoting the First Amendment, actually hinders free speech by mono-
polizing expression.4 Critics have questioned whether the traditional
doctrine of "fair use" provides the public with adequate access to copy-
righted works.' They have argued that, in our age of mass communica-
tion, there is sometimes no substitute for use of an author's original
expression.6 According to this view, when a copyrighted work is of great
public interest or importance, the informational needs of the many must
outweigh the property rights of a few.7 Critics also fear that some au-
thors will misuse the copyright monopoly to withhold works from the
public entirely. Copyright may then serve as an accomplice to censor-
ship, rather than as an engine of free expression.' To eliminate the al-
leged tension between copyright and free speech, commentators have
urged the creation of an explicit First Amendment immunity against in-
fringement claims. While there are almost as many different plans as
there are commentators, one theme is common to all of them-the subor-
dination of copyright law to the First Amendment.
In 1969, Lionel Sobel warned of a constitutional "storm" between
copyright and the First Amendment looming on the horizon. 9 Accord-
ing to Sobel, recent cases had "insidiously injected" free speech doctrines
into the law of fair use. t° Sobel predicted that this new development in
the law portended a "coming clash between First Amendment 'free
speech and press' principles and copyright clause exclusive-right princi-
ples."" With the benefit of hindsight, this essay evaluates the accuracy
of Sobel's prediction and tracks the path taken by the gathering storm
since he first identified it almost twenty years ago. In the context of an
increasing demand for a First Amendment exception to copyright, this
essay reviews the history of the issue from the 1960's to the present, and
ventures its own prediction for the future.
Part I of the essay identifies the goals of the First Amendment and
shows that copyright law already promotes those goals through the idea
and expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, and other specific provi-
4. See generally notes 65-147 and accompanying text.
5. See generally notes 65-147 and accompanying text.
6. See generally notes 65-147 and accompanying text.
7. See generally notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
8. See generally notes 88, 93-99, 153-54 and accompanying text.
9. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971) (National Second Prize Award Essay, Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition, 1969).
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. at 80.
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sions contained in the Act. Part II identifies the origins of the copyright/
First Amendment storm and analyzes the justifications made by judges
and commentators for creating a free speech privilege to the rights
granted by copyright. Part III outlines the numerous plans designed to
achieve that goal and explains why they are flawed. Part IV argues that
we must not, under any circumstances, recognize a First Amendment
privilege to copyright law and permit infringement in the name of free
speech. The article concludes by looking to all the relevant signs and
forecasting an end to the copyright versus First Amendment "storm."
II. THE EXISTING BALANCE BETWEEN COPYRIGHT
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Any law regulating speech-including the law of copyright-must
contend with the First Amendment. But before we can identify areas of
potential conflict between free speech and copyright, it becomes neces-
sary to discuss the principles underlying the First Amendment. Until we
know what the First Amendment protects, it is impossible to know
whether copyright interferes with its functions. The literature on free
speech is vast and controversial, and this article makes no pretense of
pushing First Amendment analysis to it limits here.12 Instead, the article
outlines the fundamental free speech values that few scholars dispute.
Once the functions and boundaries of the system of freedom of expres-
sion are defined, a First Amendment critique of the Copyright Act will
be possible.
A. Functions of the First Amendment
Alexander Meiklejohn argued that freedom of speech is a precondi-
tion to self-government.13 According to his interpretation, the purpose
of the First Amendment "is to give every voting member of the body
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those
problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal."14
Interested initially in only political speech, Dr. Meiklejohn came to de-
12. I leave for another day a discussion of various theories of the left which claim that the
First Amendment is a source of oppression, not freedom. See generally Bachmann, The Irrele-
vant First Amendment, 7 COMM. & L.J. 3 (1985); Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 140 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Tushnet, Corporations & Free
Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
13. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948);
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1965).
14. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1965).
1987]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
fine the spectrum of speech related to self-government broadly.' 5 He as-
signed First Amendment protection to "education... the achievements
of philosophy and the sciences ... literature and the arts."'
16
Professor Thomas Emerson identified four values promoted by the
First Amendment: individual self-fulfillment, the attainment of truth,
public participation in social and political decision-making, and main-
taining a balance between stability and orderly change.m7 Professor Nim-
mer identified three First Amendment functions that incorporate most of
the values discussed by Meiklejohn and Emerson: enlightenment, self-
fulfillment, and safety valve.'" The enlightenment function, analogous to
Emerson's "truth" function, provides the public with access to all rele-
vant data. By protecting free expression, the First Amendment assures
that ideas, opinions and information will be disseminated freely for con-
sideration, debate, acceptance or rejection, and decision-making. To the
extent that the public is not free to discuss any facts, ideas or individuals,
the democratic process suffers.
The self-fulfillment function looks inward and recognizes the psy-
chological need of individuals to satisfy themselves through free expres-
sion of their ideas. 'I This function is based upon the premise that "the
nature of man is such that he can realize the fulfillment of self only if he
is able to speak without restraint."2 Self-fulfillment can be vicarious; the
First Amendment recognizes the rights of audiences as well as those of
speakers. 2 ' Speech which resonates within the self and strikes a respon-
sive chord can fulfill the unarticulated needs of an audience.
The safety valve function is based on the premise that people free to
express their views (especially dissenting views) and able to receive un-
censored communications are less prone to violence.22 Suppression leads
to frustration and frustation may lead to violence.23 The safety valve
function channels thought into expression, not violence.
Despite its preeminence, the First Amendment is not an absolute
15. For the leading article advocating the view that the First Amendment protects only
political speech, see Bork, Neutral Principles & Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971). Like Dr. Meiklejohn, Judge Bork eventually rejected this narrow interpretation of
the First Amendment.
16. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255.
17. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970).
18. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02-.04 (1984).
19. For a complete analysis of this function, see id. § 1.03.
20. Id. at 1-49.
21. See generally, id. at 1-20 to 1-22.
22. For a brief review of this function, see id. § 1.04.
23. The safety valve function is not central to the copyright-First Amendment contro-
versy, as copyright does not prevent people from expressing their own views.
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that forbids all laws affecting speech. This literal interpretation of the
First Amendment, which never gained widespread acceptance, would
grant promiscuous protection to all speech, under any circumstances.24
Compelling interests permit the state to curb free speech when necessary.
Familiar limitations on speech include the laws of libel, fraud, perjury,
conspiracy, national security, patent and copyright. In each case, the
state regulates speech to promote socially useful goals.25
B. A First Amendment Critique of Copyright
Having identified the essential First Amendment values which any
valid restriction on speech must outweigh, we are now prepared to ad-
dress the hitherto unanswered question: Does the Copyright Act violate
the First Amendment? 26 Contrary to assertions made by those who
claim that copyright inhibits free speech, the Copyright Act is remarka-
bly sensitive to First Amendment values. The Act favors speech in nu-
merous ways. It protects expression but not ideas, it excludes certain
works from the schedule of copyrightable subject matter, it limits the
duration of protection, and it denies authors absolute dominion over
their works through the doctrine of fair use. In these and other ways,
copyright law accomodates free speech interests.
1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
A copyright regime that allowed authors to monopolize ideas would
clearly interfere with the functions of the First Amendment. Little com-
munication or innovation would occur if people could not build upon the
ideas of others. As Professor Nimmer argued, "the market place of ideas
would be utterly bereft, and the democratic dialogue largely stifled, if the
only ideas which might be discussed were those original with the speak-
ers. '9 2 7 But the Copyright Act ensures that this will not happen, for it
states explicitly that "in no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea.... "28 While copyright protects
24. Justice Black was the leading proponent of the absolutist position. See Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutists" A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 (1962);
NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.01, at 2-3 ("Indeed, the absolutist view has never been fully ac-
cepted by any member of the Supreme Court other than Justice Black." (footnote omitted)).
25. See generally NIMMER, supra note 18, § 2.01, at 2-1 to 2-8; W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE
PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 467 (1985).
26. It was settled some time ago that the First Amendment does not render the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution inoperative. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amend-
ment Guarantees of Free Speech & Press? 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181-82 (1970); PATRY,
supra note 25, at 462-66.
27. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[B] at 1-72 (1985).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1984).
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an author's expression, it allows others to use the ideas underlying that
expression. For example, an author who writes a biography of Abraham
Lincoln cannot prevent others from writing about Lincoln. Nor can a
writer who expresses a new theory explaining the Kennedy assassination
stop anyone else from advocating the same theory in a subsequent book.
The unprotected status of ideas serves the First Amendment well, for "it
is exposure to ideas, and not their particular expression, that is vital if
self-governing people are to make informed decisions."29
The success of the idea/expression dichotomy as a balance between
free speech and copyright depends upon, of course, how one chooses to
define "idea" and "expression." An overbroad concept of "expression"
might restrict access to ideas in addition to protecting an author's expres-
sion, thereby frustrating the goals of the First Amendment. On the other
hand, copyright obviously protects more than an author's exact words.3 °
But how much more? Determining at what point protection ends and
public domain begins becomes more difficult when one considers that the
so-called "line," dividing idea from expression, may not exist. Some
commentators have argued that all expressions are ideas and that no idea
can exist independent of its expression.3I According to this interpreta-
tion, when we draw the "line," we are really deciding how specific an
idea must be before we will grant ownership of it through copyright.
Once an idea reaches a certain level of generality-and this can vary
from case to case-we determine that it has entered the common pool
which is available to all and owned by no one. 32 The idea/expression
dichotomy is simply a shorthand way of describing that point on the
continuum where ideas become too general to receive protection.
Shorthand or not, the results of drawing the line between what is
copyrightable and what is not are usually satisfactory. Drawing the line
may be more difficult in some cases than in others, but, as Professor
Nimmer observed, "on the whole... it appears that the idea-expression
line represents an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright
and free speech interests.,
33
29. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.10[B], at 1-75.
30. Otherwise, as Judge Learned Hand cautioned, "a plagiarist would escape by immate-
rial variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
31. See, e.g., Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea Expression Fallacy in a Mass Com-
munications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735 (1967), reprinted in 16 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (AS-
CAP) (1968).
32. Id.
33. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.10[B], at 1-76.
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2. The Uncopyrightability of Facts
If the notion of copyrighting ideas offends First Amendment values,
then the copyrighting of facts would be even more intolerable. But once
again the Copyright Act leans in favor of free speech by excluding facts
from its subject matter. The Act states that copyright protection may
subsist only in "original works of authorship."'" Facts fail to overcome
this hurdle. While an author may be the first to unearth a fact, or the
first to reveal it to the public, the fact cannot qualify as his original work
of authorship. Professor Nimmer explained the rationale succinctly:
"No one may claim originality as to facts. Facts may be discovered, but
they are not created by an act of authorship. One who discovers an
otherwise unknown fact may well have performed a socially useful func-
tion, but the discovery as such does not render him an 'author'. . . .,
To dispel any doubts about the matter, the Act goes on to state that "in
no case does copyright protection ... extend to any... discovery.... "36
As a result, no author can claim ownership of newsworthy, historical,
biographical, scientific or other facts that he discovers. The claim that
copyright law does not protect facts is not however entirely true. A line
of cases provides for the protection of the selection and arrangement of
facts in directories, compilations and similar repositories of factual infor-
mation.37  A few courts have extended this protection to works of his-
tory and biography, but this is clearly the minority view.3" Some
commentators, however, believe that copyright law should afford greater
protection to factual works than it does at present. 39 According to this
view, the value of some works derives more from the facts they contain
than from their expression. The uncopyrightability of facts renders these
works vulnerable to appropriation by opportunists who plunder the fruits
of the first author's effort and research. The initial author becomes the
victim of those who reap where they have not sown. In response to this
34. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1984).
35. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 2.11[A], at 2-158.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1984).
37. For an analysis of the copyrightability of factual works, see NIMMER, supra note 27,
§ 2.11[A]-[F], at 2-157 to 2-169.
38. Id. at 2-167.
39. For discussion of the issue, see Hill, Copyright Protection for Historical Research: A
Minority View, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 45 (1984); Note, Recent Development:
Copyright Law & Factual Works-Is Research Protected?, 58 WASH. L. REv. 619 (1983); Tay-
lor, The Uncopyrightability of Historical Matter: Protecting Form Over Substance & Fiction
Over Fact, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 33 (1983); Denicola, Copyright in Collections of
Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516
(1981); Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection & Representation of Facts, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 1569 (1983).
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perceived inequity, some commentators have urged that factual works be
given greater protection.' If this controversial "sweat-of-the-brow" the-
ory of copyright, which seems to reward earnestness and labor as much
as originality, were ever to become controlling law, it would do so at the
expense of free speech. At present, however, copyright protects only a
narrow range of "fact" works from copying, and even then it does not
create a property right in the facts per se.
3. The Uncopyrightability of Government Works
No expression is more relevant to the vitality of the democratic dia-
logue than works of the United States Government. Presidential
speeches, congressional debates, judicial opinions and agency reports are
the raw material of politics.4 Wide dissemination of these works serves
the enlightenment function of the First Amendment by giving people ac-
cess to information about the conduct of their government. If govern-
mental officials and organizations could monopolize their literary output,
copyright might well be used to withhold certain works from the public.
The cloak of copyright might help silence criticism of the government,
prevent exposure of official misconduct, and exclude the public from par-
ticipating in the resolution of important issues. The "Pentagon Papers"
might never have been published if the government controlled the copy-
right to the documents.42
The Copyright Act preempts these scenarios by providing that
"Copyright protection ... is not available for any work of the United
States Government ... ."' Therefore, anyone may reprint any govern-
ment work without risking liability for infringement.' The exclusion of
government works from the list of copyrightable subject matter does not,
of course, guarantee public access to all such works. Our officials may
invoke national security, executive privilege and other doctrines to re-
strict access to material. Indeed, the extent to which the government can
impose secrecy on its works without violating the First Amendment is
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. One commentator has argued that federal contractors inhibit the democratic dialogue
by copyrighting works produced at the behest of the federal government. See Note, A Consti-
tutional Analysis of Copyrighting Government-Commissioned Works, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 425
(1984).
42. The Supreme Court refused to order a prior restraint of publication of the papers in
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). For a discussion of the case, see
Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg
Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1984).
44. This license may not, however, apply to certain works commissioned by the govern-
ment. See Note, supra note 41.
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the subject of vigorous debate today.4" While government secrecy may
be a problem for the democratic dialogue, it is not a problem created or
caused by copyright law.
4. Other Accommodations: Originality Requirement, Limited
Duration, First Sale Doctrine, Lending Right
Several other features of copyright law serve the interests of free
speech. According to the Act, only "original works of authorship" are
eligible for copyright protection. 46 The originality requirement asks only
that the protected expression be original to the author; it does not require
that the expression be unique. By this provision, the Act leaves the door
open for independent and even simultaneous creation by another author
who did not have access to the first author's work.47
The limited duration of copyright protection-the life of the author
plus fifty years-ensures that all works will ultimately repose in the pub-
lic domain.48 The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits
perpetual copyright, but otherwise gives Congress complete discretion to
fix the specific term of protection.49 While Professor Nimmer was surely
correct to conclude that an absurdly long term "limited" to one-thou-
sand years would be unconstitutional, it is by no means clear that Con-
gress could not have codified a term of life plus seventy-five years, one-
hundred years, or even longer.50 Although no recent commentator has
advocated perpetual copyright, several have criticized the current term
for favoring the interests of proprietors over those of the public.5" On the
whole, however, the consensus view is that the term of life plus fifty years
45. See generally Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional Statutory Dimen-
sions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1985); Comment, Symposium: National Security & Civil
Liberties, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 685 (1984); Comment, Freedom of Speech, National Security
Democracy: The Constitutionality of National Security Decision Directive 84, 12 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 173 (1984); Halperin & Hoffman, Secrecy & the Right to Know, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (Summer 1976).
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1984).
47. NiMMER, supra note 27, § 2.01.
48. The term may vary slightly for joint works, anonymous works, pseudonymous works
and works made for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1984).
49. The Copyright Clause requires only that the protection granted to authors and inven-
tors be for "limited times." Congress is free to interpret that requirement as it chooses. Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). ("Within the limits of the constitutional grant,
the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the
policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to
the grant to Congress of Article I power.")
50. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.05[A], at 1-34.
51. For a representative view, see Goldwag, Copyright Infringement & The First Amend-
ment, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 4 (1979), reprinted in Note, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
320 (1979).
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strikes the appropriate balance between competing public and private
interests.52 It is long enough to give authors of any age a healthy incen-
tive to create and brief enough to provide total and free access to the
common literary, artistic and scientific heritage of the past. The first sale
doctrine and the lending right encourage the broad dissemination of
copyrighted works by denying authors control over the physical embodi-
ment of their copyrighted expression.5 3 For example, a copyright propri-
etor cannot prevent an individual who has purchased a copy of his latest
book from reselling that copy, lending it to a friend, or giving it away.
Nor can the author stop a used bookstore from buying and reselling the
book. A library is free to purchase ten copies of a best-selling novel and
lend them to two-hundred and fifty patrons during the next year. By
permitting maximum dissemination of physical copies of a copyrighted
expression without interference from the author, the Act gives increased
circulation to that material.54
5. Fair Use
The fair use doctrine allows certain uses to be made of copyrighted
works without the consent of the author. Fair use is perhaps the most
written about and certainly the most complex subject in copyright law.
It is noteworthy that virtually every work on the subject begins by re-
peating the now famous line that described the fair use doctrine as "the
most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."55 The literature on
fair use is rich, and it is impossible to do it justice in a brief summary.
5 6
Instead, this essay discusses the key elements of the doctrine and then
emphasizes what fair use is not.
Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement. Some courts have
confused the doctrine with a finding that the copied material was not
copyrightable in the first place, but the accepted view is that fair use
enters the scene only after infringement of copyrighted expression has
occurred. Professor Nimmer made the distinction clearly:
[T]he crucial problem of fair use . . . arises where it is estab-
lished by admission or by the preponderance of the evidence
52. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 1.05[d], at 1-36.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1984). Section 202 states explicitly that "ownership of a copyright
... is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied."
54. Certain provisions in the Act restrain the exploitation of physical copies of works. For
example, the rights to perform or display a copyrighted work publicly remain exclusive to the
author. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), (5) (1984).
55. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939).
56. For the best treatments of fair use, see generally PATRY, supra note 25; NIMMER, supra
note 27, § 13.05[A]-[F]; L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS & FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT (1978).
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that the defendant has copied sufficiently from the plaintiff so
as to cross the line of substantial similarity. The result must
necessarily constitute infringement unless the defendant is ren-
dered immune from liability because the particular use which
he has made of plaintiff A's material is fair use: In this more
meaningful sense fair use is a defense not because of the absence
of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact that the sim-
ilarity is substantial.1
7
Fair use originated as a judge-made, common law defense, but is
now codified in the Copyright Act, which specifies four factors to deter-
mine whether a use is fair. The factors are: the purpose and character of
the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the proportion of the work
that was taken, and the economic impact of the use on the copyright
proprietor. 58 The preceding list is not exclusive; Congress intended only
to codify existing law and allow for its evolution.59 Courts have applied
different tests to different categories of works that have included book
reviews, photocopying, parody, satire and various educational uses." In
brief, the law of fair use permits minimal takings that are not detrimental
to the system of copyright law. It is important to consider what fair use
is not. The doctrine is not a "free speech" exception to copyright,
although it does have the effect of promoting First Amendment goals by
encouraging the creation of subsequent works which criticize or build
upon earlier expressions. Fair use is functional-it allows minimal tak-
ings only insofar as they promote the progress of the arts and only to the
degree that they do not undermine the exclusive rights of authors guar-
anteed by copyright law.
II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ALLEGED CONFLICT
BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The demand for a First Amendment exception to copyright is a dis-
tinctly modern phenomenon. The issue was apparently never litigated in
the courts nor raised in the commentary during the first one-hundred and
seventy-five years that copyright law and the First Amendment coexisted
in America.61
Neither did the issue attract the attention of the major First Amend-
57. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05, at 13-62.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1984).
59. NIMMER, supra note 27, § 13.05[A], 13-65.
60. See generally id. § 13.05[A]-[F].
61. Copyright law and the First Amendment have coexisted for 195 years, and the first
"free speech" case was brought 20 years ago. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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ment or copyright scholars: none of the important works published in
this century prior to 1970 even mentioned a copyright-free speech con-
flict, let alone pursued the issue.6 2 The fact that the leading authorities
on intellectual property and free speech failed to notice a potential con-
flict between the First Amendment and copyright did not mean, of
course, that the potential for conflict did not exist. But their omission of
the topic from their books and treatises does underscore the fact that the
debate over creating a First Amendment-based privilege to copyright
lacks a firm tradition in the law of intellectual property. It was not until
two cases in the 1960's adopted First Amendment reasoning to excuse
infringement that copyright scholars took note of the storm gathering
before their eyes. We return now to the beginning, to the cases that
started it all: Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.
("Rosemont") 63 and Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates ("Geis").
64
A. The First Cases
In 1965, Howard Hughes learned that Random House was planning
to publish an unauthorized biography of his life.65 In an attempt to dis-
rupt the project, Hughes formed a corporation, Rosemont Enterprises
("Rosemont"), and assigned to it the exclusive right to publish his auto-
biography. Attorneys for Rosemont then warned Random House that
Hughes would "make trouble" if the unauthorized book was published.
To stop publication, Rosemont brought suit against Random House in
1966 for unfair competition and invasion of privacy. Shortly thereafter,
Rosemont obtained a set of the galley proofs of the forthcoming biogra-
phy and learned that the author had drawn heavily from three copy-
righted articles about Hughes that appeared in Look magazine in 1954.
Rosemont purchased the copyrights to the Look articles three days
62. Chafee's FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920) and FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
(1941) do not identify copyright as a threat to free speech. DeWolf's AN OUTLINE OF COPY-
RIGHT LAW (1925) and Ball's THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY (1944)
are both silent on the issue. The first edition of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1963), then and now
the leading treatise, did not identify the conflict. Professor Emerson's THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), one of the most influential books ever written about the First
Amendment, does not even contain the word "copyright" in its index. Alexander Meiklejohn,
whom Archibald Cox once described as "perhaps the foremost American philosopher of free-
dom of expression," (A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 2 (198 1)) did not perceive copyright
as endangering the First Amendment in FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERN-
MENT (1948) or in POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1965).
63. 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
64. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65. For a detailed factual history, see PATRY, supra note 25, at 72-76.
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before the Random House biography was published and instituted a
copyright infringement suit against the publisher within the week.
The district court found that the material taken from the Look arti-
cles "was substantial in both the quantitative and qualitative sense," and
granted a preliminary injunction to Rosemont.66 The court of appeals,
however, reversed the district court and vacated the injunction:
By this preliminary injunction, the public is being deprived of
an opportunity to become acquainted with the life of a person
endowed with extraordinary talents .... "Everyone will agree
that at some point the public interest in obtaining information
becomes dominant over the individual's desire for privacy."
Thus, in balancing the equities at this time in our opinion the
public interest should prevail over the possible damage to the
copyright owner.67
The notion of equating fair use with public interest was refined two
years later in a suit involving use of the Zapruder film of the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy.68 Professor Josiah Thompson, author of Six
Seconds in Dallas,69 was a member of the cottage industry that special-
ized in criticizing the central finding of the Warren Commission-
namely, that there was no evidence of a conspiracy to kill the President.7 °
In his book, Thompson advanced the thesis that three assassins, not one,
fired on the presidential limousine. To support his conclusion, Thomp-
son attempted to prove that President Kennedy and Governor Connally
were not hit by one bullet, but by two separate bullets fired so rapidly in
succession that Lee Harvey Oswald would not have had time to reload
and fire the second shot.71
To illustrate his thesis, Thompson wanted to publish frames from
the Zapruder film which he claimed showed that Governor Connally was
not wounded by the same bullet that struck the President. Time-Life, the
owner of the copyright in the film, refused to grant permission to
reproduce the frames. Thompson and his publisher, Bernard Geis, in-
cluded illustrations of the frames anyway, and Time-Life sued for
66. Rosemont, 256 F. Supp. at 64.
67. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 309.
68. Shortly after the assassination, Time, Inc., the publisher of Life magazine, purchased
the copyright to the home movie.
69. J. THOMPSON, SIx SECONDS IN DALLAS (1967).
70. For an introduction to the industry, see S. WHITE, SHOULD WE Now BELIEVE THE
WARREN REPORT? 1-9 (1968).
71. The frames of the Zapruder film functioned as a clock of the assassination. According
to Thompson, the film proved that too little time had elapsed between shots for Oswald to have
shot both the President and the Governor.
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infringement.72
The district court held that the copying was fair use because it did
not injure the value of the film and because the book did not compete
with the plaintiff's magazine or the film itself.73 In a telling passage,
however, the court revealed that the public interest figured prominently
in its decision:
In determining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in
favor of defendants.
There is a public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy. Thompson did
serious work on the subject and has a theory entitled to public
consideration. While doubtless the theory could be explained
with sketches of the type used at page 87 of the Book and in the
Saturday Evening Post, the explanation actually made in the
Book with copies is easier to understand.74
B. The Scholarly Response
A trio of articles followed Rosemont and Geis. In an article written
in 1969 and published in 1971, Lionel Sobel attacked the reasoning of the
decisions for incorporating First Amendment values into the fair use
doctrine.75 Although neither court stated explicitly that it had created a
new First Amendment exception to copyright, it was obvious that both
courts allowed free speech values to distort their application of the fair
use test. Sobel made the point bluntly:
The courts were so taken with the importance to the public of
the particular materials in question, they rode roughshod over
the copyright law and permitted what amounted to nothing less
than wholesale theft .... [Now] there are cases on the books
which stand for the principle that when the public interest in
access to certain materials is great enough, the copyright holder
does not have the exclusive rights he otherwise would have
had.76
The danger, as Sobel saw it, was that courts would apply different
fair use tests to different works, depending on the degree of public inter-
est in the copyrighted material. In other words, the more important the
72. In an unsuccessful attempt to avoid being sued for infringement, Bernard Geis pub-
lished charcoal drawings of the frames, rather than the actual photographic images.
73. Geis, 293 F. Supp. at 146.
74. Id.
75. Sobel, supra note 9, at 61.
76. Id. at 70.
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work, the less copyright protection it deserved. This ad hoc standard
would pervert the incentive function of copyright, which bestows the
highest rewards on authors who create the most popular expressions.7 '
Before Rosemont and [Geis], fair use permitted minimal takings to pro-
mote the creation of new works. Those cases expanded the doctrine to
justify substantial takings in the name of the public interest. Sobel con-
cluded that the alleged conflict between copyright and free speech was
illusory and that "Rosemont and [Geis] were incorrect in suggesting that
the First Amendment operates in some fashion to restrict the scope of
copyright protection.' To create a First Amendment-based exception
to the exclusive rights enjoyed by authors would degenerate into ad hoc
balancing and undermine the structure of copyright law. Despite the ef-
fectiveness of his rebuttal, Sobel was guarded in his prediction for the
future and warned that the possibility of a coming clash between copy-
right and free speech was "not as far-fetched as one might suppose.'
79
Professor Nimmer echoed many of Sobel's points in his seminal arti-
cle published in 1970.80 Nimmer reviewed the history and goals of copy-
right and the First Amendment and concluded that the two bodies of law
were not in opposition. He identified the idea-expression dichotomy as
the key balance between copyright and free speech interests: "It is expo-
sure to ideas, and not their particular expression, that is vital if self-gov-
erning people are to make informed decisions."'" The intrusion of First
Amendment values into copyright may lie in the "failure to distinguish
between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging consti-
tutional limitation on copyright contained in the First Amendment."8 2
Nimmer believed that both Rosemont and Geis failed to make the
distinction. He pointed out that the defendant in Rosemont was free to
copy facts and ideas from the Look magazine articles. Howard Hughes
could not have stopped the public from learning about his life any more
than the original author of those articles could have prevented others
from writing about Hughes. No matter how many copyrights he
purchased, Hughes could never "own" his biographical facts. But in-
stead of copying only information, the defendant copied a substantial
77. Id. at 76-78.
78. Id. at 80.
79. Id.
80. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970), reprinted in Nimmer, Copyright & the First Amend-
ment: The Inaugural Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 255
(1970).
81. Nimmer, supra note 80, at 1191.
82. Id. at 1200.
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portion of the copyrighted expression from the Look articles. And ac-
cording to Nimmer, "insofar as they chose to avoid the expenditure of
time and skill necessary to evolve their own expressions, and instead cop-
ied the plaintiff's expression, there can be no First Amendment justifica-
tion for such copying. "83
Professor Nimmer also argued that Geis concealed its First Amend-
ment reasoning under the guise of fair use.8 4 But at that point he de-
parted from Sobel's view that the use amounted to theft and instead
introduced his concept of the "wedding" of idea and expression.85 Nim-
mer argued that it was impossible to separate the idea of the Zapruder
film from the expression:
[I]n the welter of conflicting versions of what happened that
tragic day in Dallas, the Zapruder film gave the public authori-
tative answers that it desperately sought; answers that no other
source could supply with equal credibility. Again, it was only
the expression, not the idea alone, that could adequately serve
the needs of an enlightened democratic dialogue."86
To support his argument, Nimmer fashioned a hypothetical example
around the photographs of the My Lai massacre. He claimed that the
photographs made a "unique contribution to an enlightened democratic
dialogue" and that "the photographic expression, not merely the idea,
became essential if the public was to fully understand what occurred in
that tragic episode."8 7
Nimmer concluded by siding with the public interest over the right
of the proprietor: "It would be intolerable if the public's comprehension
of the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the copyright owner
of the photographs."88 As a solution to the perceived dilemma, Nimmer
proposed that use of so-called "news photographs" be privileged by the
First Amendment. 9 Nimmer realized, however, that he had introduced
a concept into copyright law that might grow into the exception that
devoured the rule; therefore, he was careful to limit his proposed excep-
tion to what he thought was a narrow category. He explicitly rejected
the idea of a First Amendment privilege based on a public-interest stan-
dard or on the mere wedding of idea and expression that was characteris-
83. Id. at 1203.
84. Id. at 1200.
85. Id. at 1196-1200.
86. Id. at 1198.
87. Id. at 1197.
88. Id. (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 1199.
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tic of all graphic works.' Finally, to ameliorate the economic harm
done to copyright owners, Nimmer proposed a compulsory license rather
than an outright taking.9'
In the last of our trio of articles, Paul Goldstein identified copyright
as a serious threat to free speech. 92 Unlike Sobel and Nimmer, Goldstein
argued that private property was an enemy of free expression. According
to this interpretation, copyright owners possess monopoly power which
they could use to regulate the content, time of release and price of expres-
sion.93 Furthermore, the copyright monopoly conflicts with the public's
First Amendment "right to hear." '94 Copyright law allows proprietors to
withhold works from the public entirely, or to "delimit the size and eco-
nomic status of the audience" by fixing the number of copies printed and
setting the price.9" Even more ominously, "the holder of an enterprise
monopoly ...has an additional, affirmative power to provide for the
broad dissemination of copyrighted material consistent.., with his own
social, political and economic views." 96 This result was more likely if the
proprietor engaged in "copyright aggrandizement" and accumulated
many copyrights. 97 It was an enterprise monopoly, says Goldstein, that
Howard Hughes tried to build in Rosemont by aggregating the copy-
rights to articles and manuscripts about his life.98 Geis demonstrated the
harm that free speech can suffer when a copyright owner refuses to li-
cense a work and chooses to withhold it from the public.99
Goldstein called for an explicit First Amendment privilege to copy-
right based upon a public interest standard: "Copyright's monopoly
boundaries must be susceptible to expansion or contraction according to
the relative urgency of the public interest ... as the ... public interest
... increases, so the property interest protected by the copyright ought
correspondingly to diminish."" Goldstein proposed that infringement
be excused when the appropriated material is "relevant to the public in-
terest" and the infringer's use "independently advances" that interest.10
No infringement should be actionable without proof of economic harm-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970).




97. Id. at 1039.
98. Id. at 986.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1016.
101. Id. at 988.
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"no matter how unscrupulous an infringer's conduct may appear."' 2
And even when harm is shown, courts should not grant equitable relief.
C. 1970-1985: The Rising of the Storm and its Climax in Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises
The preceding articles, which inaugurated the scholarly debate on
the copyright-First Amendment problem, staked out three alternative
positions. The conservative, Sobel, maintained that the conflict was illu-
sory, and insisted that a First Amendment privilege to infringe would
undermine the system of the copyright law. The moderate, Nimmer,
joined with most of Sobel's analysis but tentatively proposed an explicit
First Amendment exception for a narrow category of newsworthy works
in which idea and expression had merged. The radical, Goldstein, at-
tacked the property right underpinnings of copyright law and demanded
a broad, public-interest-based privilege to the copyright monopoly.
During the next several years, courts and commentators wrestled
with the issues raised by Sobel, Nimmer and Goldstein. Defendants in
the infringement suits began to raise the First Amendment defense, but
with notable lack of success. 10 3 The unreceptivity of the courts to the
new doctrine did not, however, halt the procession of commentary from
the academy. Articles on copyright and the First Amendment appeared
occasionally, without causing undue excitement.
1' 4
102. Id. at 1030.
103. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Scorecard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("[T]he First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in
intellectual property."); Iowa State University Research Found., Inc. v. A.B.C., 621 F.2d 57,
61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he public interest in the free flow of information is assured by the law's
refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts."); H.C. Wainwright v. Wall Street Transcript
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1014 (1978) ("[T]he public has a right to know them in the particular form in which
an author assembles and expresses them"); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (death of Charlie Chaplin does not excuse infringing
news broadcast of film clips). An explicit-amendment privilege to copyright law has been
recognized only once, and that decision was affirmed on other grounds without reaching the
First Amendment question. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 445 F.
Supp. 875, aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
104. They include, in order of their appearance: Patterson, Private Copyright & Public
Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (1975); Rosenfeld, The
Constitutional Dimensions of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 790
(1975); Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed Test, 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 1158; Denicola, Copyright & Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Goldwag, Copyright Infringement & The First
Amendment, 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1979), reprinted in Note, Copyright In-
fringement & the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 320 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-
Commercial Speech-Copyright & the First Amendment: Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder
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But then, in 1979, a suit was filed that crystallized the copyright-
versus-free speech debate as it wound its way slowly up to the United
States Supreme Court. That suit was Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises-the Gerald Ford memoirs case.' 0 When the Court handed
down its opinion in 1985, it did more than merely decide whether The
Nation's copying of three-hundred words from President Ford's copy-
righted manuscript was permissible "fair use"; the Court also signalled
that the end of the copyright-First Amendment "storm" may be near.
One caveat before turning to Harper & Row-for two reasons, this
essay does not provide a long and detailed recitation of the facts and
history of the case. Excellent summaries already exist, and there is no
need to repeat here what is available elsewhere. 0 6 More importantly, it
Newspapers, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 242; Campbell, Copyright & News Values: An Accommodation,
25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 121 (1980); Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replace-
ment of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39
(1980); Kulzick & Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 LoY. L.A.L.
REV. 57 (1980); Brittin, Constitutional Fair Use, 28 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 141
(1982); Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini. Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Pub-
licity & Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983); Note, Copyright, Free Speech, & the
Visual Arts, 93 YALE L. J. 1565 (1984); Comment, A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoid-
ing a First Amendment Conflict, 35 EMORY L. J. 163 (1986).
105. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
106. See generally, T. BRENNAN, Harper & Row v. The Nation, COPYRIGHTABILITY &
FAIR USE, DEPT. OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC POLICY OFFICE DISCUSSION PAPER (1984); Com-
ment, Copyright & the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135
(1984); Comment, The Stage of Publication As a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row Publishers
v. Nation Enterprises?, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597 (1984); Mandelbaum, The Nation: Overpro-
tection of the First Amendment in Fair Use Analysis, 32 J. COPYRIGHT. SOC'Y 138 (1984);
Note, Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating the Fair Use Accommoda-
tion of Competing Copyright & First Amendment Interests, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (1984);
Note, Two Approaches to the Fair Use Doctrine: A Look at the Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises, Decisions, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 89 (1984); Comment, Harper & Row v.
The Nation: A First Amendment Privilege for News Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253 (1985); Crowley, A First Amendment Exception to Copyright
for Exigent Circumstances, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 437 (1985); Goroff, Fair Use & Unpublished
Works: Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 9 ART & L. 325 (1985); Comment, Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Copyright Protection of Unpublished Works Written by
Public Officials, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 221 (1986); Francione, Facing the Nation: The
Standards for Copyright, Infringement, & Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 519
(1986); Note, Copyright: The Public Figure Expansion of the Fair Use Doctrine Rejected, 25
WASHBURN L.J. 385 (1986); Olson, Copyright & Fair Use: Implications of Nation Enterprises
for Higher Education, 12 J.C. & U.L. 489 (1986); Note, Copyright & The First Amendment:
Nurturing the Seeds for Harvest-Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 631 (1986); Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted Work Under Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 61 TUL. L. REV. 415 (1986); Note, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enterprises: Pirating Unpublished Copyrighted Works-Does the Fair Use Doctrine Vindi-
cate First Amendment Rights?, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 501 (1986); Note, Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises - Rewriting the Fair Use Criteria?, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 379
(1986); Note, When "Fair is Foul:" A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in Harper &
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is not necessary to relitigate Harper & Row or to argue that the taking by
The Nation magazine was or was not fair use. This essay is not so much
interested in the facts of this one case as it is in the scholarly response
that Harper & Row excited. The case functioned as a lightning rod that
attracted all possible arguments in favor of creating a First Amendment
privilege for copyright infringement.'o 7 Some proposals were new; others
were variations of older plans. Examining these arguments uncovers the
common themes-and exposes the weaknesses-shared by all proposals
to create a free speech exception to copyright law. Before we begin that
undertaking, however, some familiarity with Harper & Row is useful.
In 1979, Gerald Ford was on the verge of completing his memoirs
for Harper & Row. To stimulate public interest in the forthcoming book,
Harper & Row sold Time magazine the right to publish 7,500 words
from the memoirs for a fee of $25,000.00.108 The excerpts were to focus
on the Watergate scandal and Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon. A few
weeks before the Time article was to appear, The Nation magazine ob-
tained an unauthorized, advance copy of the memoirs. 10 9 The Nation
rushed into print with a 2,500-word article largely about Watergate,
Nixon and the pardon, and caused Time to cancel its licensing agreement
with Harper & Row. °" 0 Harper & Row sued The Nation for copyright
infringement, alleging that the magazine appropriated 300 words of for-
mer President Ford's expression. The district court held for Harper &
Row, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, excusing
the copying as "fair use.""' The court was heavily influenced by the
politically significant nature of Ford's book, and reasoned that the pur-
pose of copyright law was not to withhold information from the demo-
cratic dialogue. " 2 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held that the copying by The Nation impaired the incentive function of
the Copyright Act and inflicted economic harm upon the proprietor." 
3
The Court also concluded that The Nation deprived Harper & Row of
the right of first publication, an exclusive right of copyright owners. Af-
ter applying traditional fair use doctrine and reaching a finding of in-
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218 (1986); Note, Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: A Distortion of the Fair Use Doctrine, 24 Hous. L.
REV. 363 (1987).
107. See generally infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
108. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542-43.
109. Id. at 543.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 544-45.




fringement, the Court addressed the First Amendment defense that The
Nation raised.11 4 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, rejected a
free speech defense for infringement and concluded that the theory
"would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of copy-
right protection in the work of a public figure."'"5
III. ESTABLISHING A FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE FOR
INFRINGEMENT: A SURVEY OF RECENT PROPOSALS
Many of the articles written about Harper & Row assume the need
for a First Amendment privilege and then devise plans to fulfill that
need. Although no two authors advocate identical plans, in either justifi-
cation or methodology, they do emphasize several recurring themes:
they choose expediency over adherence to principles, they confuse special
interest with public interest, they underestimate the value of secure prop-
erty rights as an incentive to creativity, and they ignore the transaction
costs that administering a First Amendment privilege would impose. As
this essay focuses on the commentary generated by Harper & Row, it also
discusses the various free speech exceptions in the context of other plans
that predate the case and that inspired some of the current proposals. To
avoid the overlap that would attend a review of all the comments and
articles one by one, I have organized them in groups according to the
type of privilege they propose.
A. Necessity
One commentator on Harper & Row encouraged courts to consider
"the necessity of the taking in order for the defendant to make his contri-
bution to the public debate of an issue."1" 6 Mere public interest in the
copyrighted expression does not satisfy this criteria, lest public interest
alone justify total and verbatim copying. Instead, the author requires the
user of the expression to make an independent contribution to the demo-
cratic dialogue: "The reproduction of copyrighted expression must be
permitted to the extent necessary to enable a speaker effectively to com-
municate his own ideas."I 7 According to this interpretation, the Geis
court erred by focusing on public interest in the facts of the Kennedy
assassination, rather than on the inability of the defendant to "accurately
114. Id.
115. Id. at 557-58.
116. Comment, Copyright & The First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59
TUL. L. REv. 135, 156 (1984).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
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offer his ideas to the public" without access to the film. 18 Similarly, the
court of appeals in Harper & Row failed to consider whether the defend-
ant "needed to appropriate the copyrighted expression." '"19 The author
concludes that it was not necessary for The Nation magazine to copy
Gerald Ford's copyrighted expression because the article was simply an
abstract of a forthcoming book-the magazine did not "need" Ford's
words to communicate any ideas of its own.
1 20
The necessity-based, First Amendment privilege possesses several
problems. The most obvious is how we define when taking copyrighted
expression is truly "necessary" to communicate an idea. When is copy-
ing helpful, and when is it essential? Self-interested defendants will argue
that every taking was essential and that they could not possibly have
explained their ideas without copying the plaintiff's work. The necessity
test encourages infringement and will lead to more copyright litigation,
thereby taxing the resources of courts and parties. Furthermore, the au-
thor neglects to set an outside limit on how much of the original work
can be copied in the name of necessity. Could the defendant in Geis have
copied every single frame of the Zapruder film and argued that total
copying was "necessary" to explain his novel theory? Finally, the plan
fails to specify an efficient method of administering the necessity excep-
tion. Presumably the courts would be forced to administer the taking
system, and the copyright owner would not be compensated when the
infringement was necessary.
The notion that the First Amendment should privilege certain "nec-
essary" uses recurs in the commentary on Harper & Row. Indeed, even
two authors who argue that The Nation magazine infringed the copyright
of a book on the verge of publication concede that necessity might justify
a taking in another case. The first commentator states that "the First
Amendment may well suggest an appropriate defense to a copyright in-
fringement charge under certain circumstances ...."2 David Goroff
seconds that view and writes that "the First Amendment [may], on rare
occasions, justify the use of an unpublished work.., but the key compo-
nent in any First Amendment defense is necessity; there must be some
showing that the borrowed material is not and has no prospect of being
available elsewhere." '122 Although Goroff's narrower necessity test
118. Id. at 157.
119. Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 158.
121. Comment, The Stage of Publication As a "Fair Use"Factor: Harper & Row Publishers
v. Nation Enterprises, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 597, 608 (1984).
122. Goroff, Fair Use & Unpublished Works: Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 9 ART &
L. 324, 346 (1985).
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stresses the unavailability of the copyrighted work, it is still vague.
Moreover, it denies a copyright owner autonomy over the decision of
when, if ever, to release his work. Presumably, the necessity test would
permit wholesale copying from an author who did not intend to publish
his work.
The necessity test is not new to Harper & Row and can be traced
back to a student note written in the 1970's. 123 The author proposed that
the First Amendment excuse infringement whenever the defendant's ex-
pression (which the author calls the "base idea") is protected speech and
whenever that base idea cannot be expressed without using the plaintiff's
copyright.'24 This plan, like the other, is flawed by its vague standards.
How is it possible to know when copying is "necessary" to communicate
the defendant's ideas? Even the author recognized the difficulty when he
admitted that "determining a standard for deciding when the protected
speech cannot be expressed without the copyrighted material is some-
what of a problem."' 25 This plan encourages defendants to perpetrate
mass infringement in the name of "necessity." While frivolous claims
may lose out in the end, they still impose costs on plaintiffs who must
enforce their copyrights and on courts that must try the cases. In con-
clusion, the necessity privilege amounts to little more than the following
proposition: "If a speaker cannot convey an idea 'effectively' without
infringing copyrighted expression, that infringement shall be privileged."
Such a test would prove impossible to define or control.
B. Public Interest
Another group of commentators has proposed a public-interest ex-
ception to copyright protection. Although these proposals share the
same rationale-that the rights of the copyright owner must yield when
the public interest in having access to the original expression reaches a
critical mass-each one defines public interest differently.
One commentator on Harper & Row argues that "news reporting of
copyrightable ... material composed by present or former public officials
reflecting on recent events relating to their public duties" is of particular
interest. 26 According to the author, such material is of "peculiar value
123. Note, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright.: A Proposed Test 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 1158.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1184.
126. Comment, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First Amendment Privilege for News Re-
porting of Copyrightable Material?, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 253, 256 (1985).
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to the political process," 127 and is "especially related to core First
Amendment values."
1 28
By focusing on the status of the copyright owner, this plan mimics
the law of libel, which applies different standards of liability to news re-
porting about public and private figures. Just as the press needs more
breathing space to write about public officials, so it needs greater access
to the copyrighted works of former officials, "because of the peculiar re-
lationship of the author and the subject matter to the political pro-
cess." ' 29 Put another way, public officials "should expect to sacrifice
certain interests for the benefit of an informed public."' 30 To avoid
problems of overbreadth and vagueness, the author of this proposal lim-
its its reach by stating that it does not apply to all "political" or "news-
worthy" expression, or even to all expressions of former officials.
Instead, he suggests that infringement be privileged by the First Amend-
ment only when the idea/expression dichotomy collapses in works by
those officials.
This plan has several weaknesses. It makes an inapt analogy be-
tween the law of libel and the law of copyright by failing to recognize
that reputation is not a property right, while copyright is. Furthermore,
the plan is susceptible to quick expansion, resting on the somewhat vague
principle that "the First Amendment requires a higher standard of pro-
tection for news reporting as it contributes to a core of national political
discourse.""'' Many types of writing, not only works by former officials,
contribute to the democratic dialogue. Indeed, the author of the propo-
sal foreshadows its expansion by speaking of "public officials" early in
the article and then discussing "public officials" and "public figures"
later. 132 The plan does not limit the extent of permissible taking and fails
to explain how to determine when so-called "linguistic fusing" of idea
and expression occurs. 33 The standard is apparently liberal, for the au-
thor suggests that President Ford's exact expression of events and ideas
may be as valuable to political discourse as the information it
communicates. 
34
Another commentator on Harper & Row has proposed a broader
public-interest standard that combines the concepts of necessity and
127. Id. at 261.
128. Id. at 263.
129. Id. at 264.
130. Id. at 299.
131. Id. at 303.
132. Id. at 298.




newsworthiness. 3 5 According to the author, the tension between free
speech and copyright "involves the exigent circumstances of a daily
newspaper or news broadcast and ... occurs when there is no time to
arrange for a license or purchase of a copyrighted work before its use is
necessitated by the public interest requirements of the First Amend-
ment." ' 36 The author believes that reporters working under deadline
pressures deserve a special privilege to take the copyrighted works of
others to avoid "chilling" the media.' 37 To keep his privilege under con-
trol, the author proposes to limit its application to daily news media dur-
ing the initial phase of a news story.
The many defects of this plan are obvious. The author presumes
that, but for the "exigent" circumstances that do not allow for time to
contact the copyright owner, proprietors would license or sell their prop-
erty. In fact, an owner may not want to allow a use by a particular
newspaper or television station. The author ignores the copyright
owner's autonomy and economic interest. Furthermore, how does one
define "necessary"? Is a use "necessary" whenever a media outlet de-
cides it wants to use a copyrighted work? And how does one define "ini-
tial phase" and "news story"? These vague notions invite repeated
litigation, which the author will complicate by introducing "expert testi-
mony" from unbiased journalists on what constitutes an authentic "news
story." ' 38 This will, we are assured, guarantee that cases turn on "jour-
nalistic standards" and not the "whims of a judge"!'3 9
C. When Idea and Expression Merge
In his amicus brief supporting The Nation, Professor Nimmer ex-
panded the reach of his theory of the merger of idea and expression to
include written works."4 According to Nimmer, "the 300 copyrightable
words arguably present a situation where ideas and expression are inex-
tricably intermingled and where, therefore, the First Amendment interest
should be held to outweigh the copyright interest."'' Nimmer argued
that because the book of Ford's memoirs was a first-person autobiogra-
135. Crowley, A First Amendment Exception to Copyright for Exigent Circumstances, 21
CAL. W.L. REV. 437 (1985).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 440.
138. Id. at 460.
139. Id.
140. Brief of the Gannett Company, Inc., Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, Inc., The New
York Times Company & the Washington Post, Amici Curiae In Support of Nation Enterprises
at 30, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
141. Id. (footnote omitted).
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phy, the "idea" of Ford's behavior "is in part wedded to what he has to
say about such conduct. ,,.." Therefore, "without some quotations of
Mr. Ford's precise words, the 'ideas' of his mental processes in connec-
tion with a given incident cannot adequately be conveyed."'
' 43
A First Amendment privilege based on the merger of idea and ex-
pression is flawed. First, the exception would prove impossible to con-
tain, as its expansion by commentators has shown. What started as a
narrow exception for news photographs has been applied to all graphic
images,144 to interesting political speech, 145 and now to any autobiogra-
phy. Secondly, and more importantly, the so-called merger of idea and
expression may be a myth. Recall the Zapruder film in Time Inc. v. Ber-
nard Geis Associates.14  For a true collapse of idea into expression to
exist, one would not be able to communicate the information that Presi-
dent Kennedy was shot through the back and the head while riding in an
open car without showing the Zapruder film. Note that we have just
conveyed a description of the assasination without use of the film. Eye-
witness testimony tells us of the raised arms, the violent impact on the
head, and Mrs. Kennedy's actions after the fatal impact. Our verbal de-
scription may not be as vivid or shocking as the film, but it is possible to
understand how Kennedy was assassinated without viewing the film.
The film may be the best record of what happened, but it is not the only
record.
The same is true of Professor Nimmer's example of the My Lai
photos.' 47 We do not need the photos to state that in May 1968, Ameri-
can soldiers shot over one-hundred men, women and children in a
Vietnamese village. Their bloodied corpses were strewn around the vil-
lage and on the roads. Again, we have just communicated the idea of My
Lai. Our audience may not believe us, or may not be outraged without
visual evidence, but we have communicated the facts. Although we may
prefer photographs, we can tell the story without them-which is exactly
what history has done for thousands of years.
If it is possible to communicate ideas without copying visual images,
it is possible to do so without appropriating written expression. Like
Howard Hughes, Gerald Ford did not "own" the facts or information
contained in his memoirs. The Nation was free to take the information
142. Id.
143. Id. at 31.
144. Note, Copyright, Free Speech & the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565 (1984).
145. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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from Ford and write its own narrative. Copying the precise expression
may make a certain idea easier to understand but, contrary to Professor
Nimmer's assertion, it was possible to have access to President Ford's
ideas without appropriating his exact expression.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ESTABLISHING A FIRST AMENDMENT
DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
The difficulties inherent in proposals to create a free speech privilege
to copyright suggest that the real problem lies not in how to define the
privilege, but in attempting to establish one in the first place. Proposed
exceptions are defined vaguely, would prove difficult to contain, and
would impose significant transaction costs on courts and litigants. For
practical reasons alone, we must reject them. But in rejecting the ex-
isting plans, we must recognize that they are dangerous not because they
will not work, but because they threaten to undermine the whole struc-
ture of copyright law. Under any guise and abetted by any justification, a
First Amendment privilege to commit copyright infringement will cause
more harm than good.
A. A First Amendment Privilege Diminishes the Autonomy of Authors
The Copyright Act gives authors the exclusive right to decide when,
where and in what form to publish their expressions. 148 A First Amend-
ment privilege renders these exclusive rights considerably less exclusive.
The justifications of "necessity," "newsworthiness" or "public interest"
would deprive an author of the right to decide when to release his work
to the public for the first time.149 Protected by these free speech excep-
148. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1984).
149. These privileges might also be used to compel an author to publish a work that he
never intended to make public. The privileges would subvert one of the essential elements of
copyright law, as expressed by Zechariah Chafee: "The author has the power to keep a copy-
righted work off the market entirely. It is right for him to decide whether what he has created
shall be published or not." Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM. L.
REv. 719, 725 (1945).
Under a "public interest" or "necessity" regime, J.D. Salinger might have failed in his
attempt to suppress the biography that contained portions of his private, unpublished corre-
spondence. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987)(remanding with directions to issue a preliminary injunction barring
publication of the biography in its present form). Salinger's motive to "censor" his correspon-
dence by withholding it from the public should be irrelevant with respect to the security of his
property rights. If the copying cannot qualify as "fair use," then it is an infringement which
the First Amendment should not privilege.
The Salinger case attracted considerable publicity. For a sampling, see Delbanco, Holden
Caulfield Goes to Law School, NEW REPUBLIC, March 9, 1987, at 27; Kaplan, Significance of
Salinger Biography Ruling Debated, NAT'L L.J., February 16, 1987, at 6; Whose Mail is it
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tions, an unauthorized publisher could disseminate excerpts without per-
mission, even before the author published the work himself. Indeed, this
is exactly what happened in Harper & Row.' 50 Furthermore, authors of
copyrighted expression that triggered the free speech privilege could no
longer prevent their works from appearing in certain publications or me-
dia. Under current copyright law, an author need not license his work to
a publication of which he disapproves. Under a First Amendment-based
compulsory license, the author would no longer have a choice.
Several advocates of a free speech exception to copyright would not
allow an author to object to any unauthorized use of his expression un-
less he met the burden of proving that the use inflicted economic
"harm."' I Such a standard would reduce an author's control over his
work dramatically. First, it is often difficult to prove the extent of eco-
nomic harm that attends an act of infringement. More importantly, few
authors would undertake the burden of proving economic harm when-
ever the costs of litigation might exceed the amount of recovery. 52
Knowing this, petty infringers could chip away the value of copyrighted
works with impunity. The loss in any one case may not be large, but in
aggregate the cost to authors will be enormous.
Under a free speech regime, copyright proprietors will no longer
have the right to withhold their works from the public. The new order
will not tolerate an author's attempt to "censor" speech that the public
has a "right" to hear. The peculiar notion that the public has a "right"
to possess copyrighted expression is the most insidious claim made by
advocates of the free speech exception, and has been condemned by de-
fenders of copyright. David Ladd, former United States Register of
Copyrights, warned that "the main attack on copyright is that it is in
opposition to the free flow of information and the public's right to know
and use."' 53 Alan J. Hartnick, former president of the Copyright Society
Anyway: J.D. Salinger Bests a Biographer in Court, NEWSWEEK, February 9, 1987, at 58;
Return to Sender: Salinger Throws a Writer's Block, TIME, February 9, 1987, at 62; Yardley,
The Catcher in the Right, WASHINGTON POST, February 9, 1987, at D2; Streitfeld, Salinger's
Biography Battle: The Author's Protest Delays 'A Writing Life,' WASHINGTON POST, August
6, 1986, at Dl.
150. See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Goldstein, Copyright & the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983
(1970). For criticism of the harm requirement, see Jochnowitz, Proof of Harm: A Dangerous
Prerequisite for Copyright Protection, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (1985); Ladd, The Harm of
the Concept of Harm in Copyright: Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 30 J. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'y 421 (1983).
152. Entertainment litigation is expensive, and for many copyright owners the issue is not
"will I win," but rather "what will it cost to win?"




of the U.S.A., seconded the warning by stating that "the coming legal
battle will utilize the fair use doctrine to attempt to subvert copyright
under the claim that the rigid application of copyright principles acts as a
censor and unreasonably impedes the public's right to receive
information."' 54
B. A Free Speech Exception Attacks the Property Right Basis of
Copyright Law
A First Amendment exception to copyright undercuts an author's
property right in his expression by depriving him of the right to exclude
others and the opportunity to exploit the work in its most highly valued
use. Copyrighted expression that is vulnerable to uncompensated taking
loses much of its value, for the value of all property derives from the
ability of its owner to exclude others from taking it. Advocates of the
First Amendment exception are well aware of this. Indeed, to some com-
mentators, undermining the sanctity of property rights is the mission, not
merely the unavoidable consequence, of the free speech exception to
copyright. In a special issue titled "The Ethics of Disclosure," published
less than a month after it ran the memoirs story, The Nation questioned
"the propriety of public officials exploiting public papers for private en-
richment."' 55 The editorial expressed alarm over the "commercializa-
tion of the Presidency,"' 56 and noted with distaste that "the newspapers
and magazines demand exclusivity in exchange for their money."' 57 The
Nation concluded with a strong endorsement of the public interest: "Our
own view is that the President's papers belong to the public. It is un-
seemly that they become the object of big-money bidding by the me-
dia."' 58 Six years later, after the Supreme Court ruled against The
Nation, the magazine published a more vigorous attack on private
property:
The decision is the latest in a series of obstacles the courts have
placed in the way of the free flow of ideas, and in many ways it
is the most troubling. The suit was brought by publishers who
claim to care about the First Amendment, but they have dis-
played a greater concern for property rights. The challenge
now is to overcome this new private-sector censorship, if not
154. Hartnick, Book Review: The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law, 8 COMM. & L. 61, 62
(1986).
155. Cornering History, THE NATION, May 5, 1979, at 483.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 485.
158. Id.
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through litigation then through legislation .... 159
A commentator who advocated a First Amendment privilege for
works of art that appropriate visual images claimed that infringement
should be protected because it is a "political statement.""6° According to
the author, appropriation "manifests a rejection of private property in
favor of a more communitarian conception of society."'16' Her rejection
of the property-right basis of copyright law was complete:
[T]he act of appropriation... reveals that society (and its legal
system) is laden with assumptions that financial incentives pro-
mote individual creating, and that property interests supercede
society's right of access to ideas and information ....
In addition the act of appropriation supports communitar-
ian values through its symbolic rejection of the "myth" of indi-
vidual expression .... [T]he artist asserts that conceptions of
individual expression, creativity, and genius are outmoded in a
mass society.1
62
Professor Chafee anticipated this attitude toward intellectual prop-
erty over forty years ago when he observed that "a good deal of the at-
tack on the assignee-owner of patents and copyrights seems to me based
on a dislike of the whole system of private property."'' 63 One wonders
whether Chafee would have classified the supporters of a First Amend-
ment privilege to commit copyright infringement as devotees of free
speech or enemies of private property.
A taking accomplished via compulsory license is no less objectiona-
ble than an uncompensated use, even though in the former case some fee
is presumably paid to the proprietor. Property loses value whenever its
owner is not free to charge what he wishes for it. A compulsory licensing
scheme substitutes an artificial price for the market price, and prevents
the proprietor from selling his work to the highest bidder. David Ladd
cautioned against such interference with the market:
Whatever one thinks of the comparative merits of national eco-
nomic planning and free markets, or of government as an in-
strument of wealth distribution, our government should abstain
as much as possible from intervention in the copyright world,
and willingly forbear from setting or affecting the value or price
of works of authorship. Otherwise, the government skews the
159. Monopolizing the News, THE NATION, June 1, 1985.
160. Note, Copyright, Free Speech, & the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1578 (1984).
161. Id.
162. Id. (footnote omitted).
163. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 510 (1945).
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copyright world, and thus what the people will hear. Better to
trust the sum of consumers' choices in what they will pay to see
and hear. If the government does intervene, we are harmed in a
more grievous way than in being denied a free copy or a cheap
copy, and the instant gratification of maximum distribution. 164
C. The Appropriation of Expression in the Name of Free Speech Will
Undermine the Incentive Function of Copyright
By diminishing the autonomy of authors and attenuating the value
of intellectual property rights, a First Amendment privilege to copyright
reduces the incentive to create new works. The incentive function is the
cornerstone of copyright law, as the Supreme Court made clear in Mazer
v. Stein: "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Con-
gress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and useful arts.' "165
The current system of copyright law gives authors the incentive to
create works of value to the public, because it is precisely those works
which will sell the largest numbers of copies and bring the highest re-
wards to their creators. Authors would have less incentive to create if
they could not capture the full economic value of their expression.
166
Uncompensated takings and compulsory licenses clearly interfere with
an author's right to profit from his work.
In addition to affecting the incentives of authors, a free speech privi-
lege will affect the incentives of those who purchase or license copy-
righted expression. Newspapers and magazines will be less inclined to
pay for the right to publish excerpts of a forthcoming book if they know
that a rival can appropriate the expression and even beat them into print
164. Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright: Thirteenth Donald C. Brace
Memorial Lecture, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 421, 431 (1983) (footnote omitted).
165. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
166. For a dissenting view on the necessity of copyright protection as an incentive, see
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, & Com-
puter Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1971). For a defense of copyright as incentive, see
Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to
Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971), reprinted in 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 99
(1971) and 21 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1974). Finally, for the response, see Breyer,
Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972). For a discussion of the economic im-
portance of well-defined property rights in general, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1-44 (1966); Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L.
& ECON. 11 (1964); Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REVIEW, May 1967 at 347-73.
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in the name of free speech. Purchasing the exclusive right to publish will
no longer guarantee the buyer that it will be the first or only publisher of
the material. As Professor Chafee noted, the power to exclude others
induces authors to engage in the risk of creating and publishers to under-
take the risk of bringing material to the market.
167
D. The Spectre of the Socialization of Copyright
The socialization of copyright, a term introduced by Professor
Monroe Price, refers to a process by which the exclusive rights of authors
are subordinated to the goal of public access via compulsory licenses.
68
The First Amendment privilege to commit infringement threatens to ac-
celerate the socialization of copyright by elevating public access above all
other copyright values. The trend is clear in the commentary-recogni-
tion of one free speech privilege incites the demand for the next one. The
history of Professor Nimmer's privilege, based on the merger of idea and
expression, is instructive on this point. Nimmer suggested a compulsory
license for a narrow category of graphic works-news photographs.
Later commentators expanded his plan: first to cover all graphic images,
and then to cover written expression. By the time of Harper & Row, even
Professor Nimmer was willing to apply his one narrow test to Gerald
Ford's memoirs.'
69
As early as 1976, Barbara Ringer, former United States Register of
Copyrights, predicted that the copyright law of the future would empha-
size public interest over private property. The new regime would still
compensate authors in some way, but would not allow them to control
when and where their works were published. 170 And once we routinely
appropriate copyrighted expression in the name of the public interest, we
are not far from taking it for any public purpose. Indeed, we have al-
167. Chafee, supra note 163, at 732. Chafee observed, correctly, that when property rights
are transient, "the total absence of any monopoly might easily deter anybody from publish-
ing." Id. To illustrate the importance of secure property rights as an incentive to bring works
to the market, Chafee recalled the history of Tolstoy's writings. "When Leo Tolstoy's scruples
against private property led him to throw all his writings into the public domain, immense
confusion followed. Many publishers and translators were worried by the absence of legal
protection against unscrupulous or incompetent rivals. Consequently, no complete English
edition appeared until forty years later when George Bernard Shaw headed a great group of
eminent writers, who urged public support of the projected Oxford University Press Centenary
Edition, so as to give it as much of a monopoly through prestige as if it were protected by
copyright." Id. at n.30.
168. Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of Compulsory Licenses, 4
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 105, 110 n.27 (1985).
169. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
170. See Note, supra note 168, at 111.
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ready taken the first step in that direction. Several states have enacted
so-called "Son-of-Sam" laws to deprive criminals of their literary prop-
erty rights on the rationale that it is good public policy to demonstrate
that crime does not pay.17 1 When the socialization of copyright is com-
pleted, the rights of authors will be vulnerable to the tyranny of the
majority.
E. A Free Speech Exception to Copyright Will
Harm the First Amendment
The free speech privilege poses several threats to the First Amend-
ment. The privilege undermines the First Amendment by creating a new
right out of whole cloth. 172 Advocates of the free speech exception in-
voke the "right to hear" doctrine. In fact, while there may be a right to
hear from a willing speaker, there is no First Amendment right to hear
from one who chooses not to speak. The "right to hear" or "right to
know" relates to access to trials, publications and government informa-
tion, not access to copyrighted expression. 173 Furthermore, advocates of
the exception to copyright forget that the First Amendment does recog-
nize a right not to speak. 174 Basing a free speech privilege to copyright
171. See generally Note, The Son-of-Sam Laws: When the Lunatic, the Criminal, & the
Poet Are of Imagination All Compact, 27 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 207 (1983); Note, Publication Rights
Agreements in Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response to the Problem, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
686 (1983); Note, Criminals-Turned-Authors: Victim's Rights v. Freedom of Speech, 54 IND.
L.J. 443 (1979); Note, Compensating the Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story-
The Constitutionality of the New York Approach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 93 (1978).
That is not to argue that it would necessarily be socially optimal to allow all individuals to
exercise the rights they are deprived of by such "Son of Sam" laws. Such laws are merely an
example of such taking, by the State, of a private property right.
172. A leading constitutional scholar has warned that courts should "think carefully before
extending the protective principles of the First Amendment to types of communication that
have not traditionally been considered essential to the maintenance of an open society." Blasi,
The Pathological Perspective & the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 479 (1985).
According to Blasi, "we must constantly take care not to trivialize the meaning of free
speech," and must avoid "the attitude all too prevalent in our recent constitutional experience,
that doctrinal expansion is a good in itself, that creative analogy is its own reward." Id. at 480
(citations omitted). For a thoughtful analysis of the consequences of creating new First
Amendment rights, see Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV. 302 (1984).
173. Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First Amendment As
Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Note, The Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 505 (1979); Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-Held Information, 89
YALE L.J. 923 (1980).
174. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 114 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 948 (1982)("The First Amendment interests... are not based
upon a desire for pecuniary gain, but upon the author's freedom to speak or remain silent as an
end in itself"); Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 296
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law on the "right to hear" would pervert First Amendment theory,
which in reality supports the copyright proprietor's right to withhold his
expression from the public.
An exception to copyright might undermine the enlightenment
function of the First Amendment by reducing the size of an audience for
a copyrighted expression. In Harper & Row, several million readers of
Time magazine lost the opportunity to read key excerpts from President
Ford's memoirs because The Nation, a magazine of small circulation,
published them first. Had The Nation not interfered with Time's serial-
ization, more people would have had access to Ford's expression. The
unauthorized appropriation prevented a copyrighted work from rising to
its most highly valued use, a use which, not coincidentally, would have
disseminated the work to the greatest number of people.
Finally, adopting a free speech exception to copyright risks trivial-
izing the First Amendment and transforming it into a burglar's tool to be
used by one competitor against another. Return again to the facts of
Harper & Row. The Nation magazine was presumably unable or unwill-
ing to pay more than Time for the right to publish excerpts from Presi-
dent Ford's memoirs.'75 The issue was not whether the public would
have access to the memoirs, for The Nation knew that Time planned to
publish excerpts, and that the book itself would be available within a few
weeks. Instead, the dispute was over which member of the "fourth es-
tate" would be the first to communicate excerpts of the memoirs to the
public. The Nation publication served its own interests, but not those of
the public. The democratic dialogue would have been served best by the
orderly and coordinated publication of authorized excerpts, followed by
N.Y.S.2d 771, 778 (1968) ("[C]opyright, both common law and statutory, rests on the assump-
tion that there are forms of expression.., which should not be divulged to the public without
the consent of their author. The purpose, far from being restrictive, is to encourage and pro-
tect intellectual labor . . . the essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper
restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined
areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as
freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.").
175. It is more likely that both factors determined The Nation's reservation price and conse-
quent actions. To have paid for the excerpt would have violated the magazine's political prin-
ciples, and would have depleted its bank account. In 1986, the magazine could not afford to
pay the judgment in favor of Harper & Row. See Baer, Collecting "The Nation's" Debt,
AMERICAN LAWYER, Jan-Feb. 1986, at 8. For a discussion of competition for the right to
"free speech," see generally Liebeler, A Property Rights Approach to Judicial Decision Making,
4 CATO JOURNAL 783, 797-803 (1985). The argument that The Nation could not "afford" to
bid for the rights to the excerpt rests on very shaky economic grounds. This is to argue that
The Nation did not possess sufficient resources (wealth) to purchase the rights. Such an argu-
ment would require a change in the distribution of wealth to accomplish the "desired" remedy.
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the memoirs in book form. Supporters of free speech must be sensitive to
misuse of the First Amendment. Trivializing the system of freedom of
expression reduces respect for it, and for that reason we must be aware of
the possibility that a First Amendment privilege to commit copyright
infringement may be a tool of self-interest masquerading as public
interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Establishing a free speech privilege to commit copyright infringe-
ment is not necessary to promote the goals of the First Amendment and
will, in the end, harm both the systems of copyright and freedom of ex-
pression. A free speech privilege would weaken the incentive function of
copyright by undermining the property right foundation on which the
law of intellectual property rests. The privilege encourages opportunistic
behavior by defendants who will justify the most outlandish acts of in-
fringement in the name of "public interest, .... newsworthiness," "neces-
sity" or the "right to know." The free speech exception would prove
difficult to contain-one exception sets the precedent for the next one.
Rejecting the First Amendment privilege will not impair the demo-
cratic dialogue. The exaggerated claims of The Nation magazine
notwithstanding, copyright proprietors cannot "comer" history. Ideas,
facts and information are not the subject matter of copyright, but are
available to all. Although the First Amendment recognizes the rights of
audiences, it does not permit the coercion of an unwilling speaker. The
right to free speech does not include the right to take the speech of others
for free. That logic can only lead to the socialization of copyright, where
authors are subject to the tyranny of the majority.
The copyright-First Amendment storm predicted almost twenty
years ago did arrive, but it did not overwhelm the system of copyright
law. Copyright has proven resilient. Congress has failed to legislate a
free speech privilege and the courts have refused to create one. In
Harper & Row, the Supreme Court forecasted the end of the storm by
declining to introduce a First Amendment privilege into the law of copy-
right. In that case, the Court recognized that the present systen of copy-
right-undisturbed by a free speech privilege to infringe-remains the
best balance between the desires of the few to profit from their creativity
and the rights of the many to enjoy freedom of expression.
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